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This article analyzes the closing gap between regulation and enforcement of environmental protection in
China and explores its implications for doing business there. It identifies three major dimensions that char-
acterize change in regulatory systems: priorities and incentives, bureaucratic alignment, and transparency
and monitoring. Using these dimensions, it describes the mechanisms that characterized China’s prior period
where enforcement of environmental protection was decoupled from regulation. Regulation and enforce-
ment are becoming re-aligned. This is due to a change in national development strategy, reorganization
of the bureaucracy, and increasing monitoring from both the government and general public. To address
these changes, firms need to embrace environmental innovation and integrate local and global standards.
They should also be more transparent and compete on reputation. (Keywords: Environmental Policy,
Environmental Protection, Organizational Behavior, Strategic Management, Government and Business,
China, Business-Government Relations)
While China has grown over the past three decades to be thesecond-largest economy in the world, numerous indicatorsshow that the natural environment has paid the price for thisprogress. For example, in 90 percent of China’s cities, the
underground water supply is contaminated and, on average, about 54 percent of
the waters of China’s seven main rivers were deemed unsafe for human consump-
tion between 2001 and 2005.1 The rate of desertification nationwide is around
900 square miles a year, an area nearly the size of Rhode Island. China is now
the largest source of sulfur-dioxide emissions in the world and Chinese factories
emit approximately three times the airborne particulates and sulfur dioxide that
U.S. factories do.2
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However, as economic development has progressed, there has been increas-
ing awareness among the government, business community, and general public of
the importance of environmental protection. Environmental security is essential
for China to continue growing, as there are substantial long-term and indirect costs
of environmental damage. It is estimated that the use of higher-polluting, cheap coal
cost China $248 billion in 2007, the equivalent of 7.1 percent of GDP, mainly due to
health impacts on workers.3
As a result, the central government has
been paying increasing attention to environmen-
tal issues. In 2006, China implemented “The
Renewable Energy Law” to change the structure
of its energy supply and to protect its environ-
ment. Later that year, the 11th Five-Year Plan
(2006–2011) addressed energy efficiency and the
enhancement of environmental protection, setting
targets such as the reduction of energy consumption per unit of GDP and the reduc-
tion of major pollutants by 20 percent and 10 percent respectively in 2010.4 In the
latest Five-Year Plan, announced in March 2011, the central government articu-
lated an aggressive series of energy-saving goals: to raise non-fossil-fuel usage to
11.4 percent of primary energy consumption, to reduce carbon emission per unit
of GDP by 17 percent, and to increase forest coverage to 21.66 percent. These
and other government actions clearly signal a greater focus on environmental
and resource sustainability and a shift to a growth model powered more by innova-
tion and technological progress than by the traditional inputs—labor, physical
resources, and capital.
Yet our qualitative research finds that this new clarity has created new
uncertainty for businesses used to the old environment. China had stringent envi-
ronmental protection laws even in the days of unbridled economic growth, but they
were not consistently enforced.5 This situation, commonly observed in developing
countries, is described as the “decoupling” of regulation and enforcement.6 Tough
regulations are put on the books in response to globalization pressures,7 but, for a
variety of reasons—culture, corruption, lack of funds, lack of expertise—they are
not enforced.
It is the recent “recoupling” of regulation and enforcement in China that
is creating significant uncertainty for business. Regulatory uncertainty has been
shown to be a significant challenge for business8 and we argue that the uncertainty
being experienced in China today among business actors is a natural outcome of
the process of “recoupling.” Business actors accustomed to little or no environmen-
tal regulation (regardless of what might have been on the books) must now figure
out which regulations are—or will be—for real and how to act in response to the
changes.
We have developed a theoretical framework that illuminates not only
the current situation, but also its history—how it arose, where it will go, and
what companies should do. We identify three important dimensions along
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which both the decoupling and the recoupling of environmental regulation and
enforcement take place. These dimensions are: governmental priorities and
incentives; bureaucratic alignment within the government; and governmental
and public transparency and monitoring.
Prior research on decoupling has typically not considered the diverse set of
organizational mechanisms leading to it.9 Our research revealed that misaligned
priorities and incentives, fragmented bureaucracy, and lack of transparency stan-
dards have been the underlying mechanisms. The Chinese government’s priorities
and incentives, communicated through national development strategies and poli-
cies such as the Five-Year Plans, provide guidance for firms trying to shape their
business opportunities and signal which business activities are appropriate. These
priorities are also manifested in the promotion incentives that guide governmental
leaders. Bureaucratic alignment is the extent to which the structure of the govern-
ment allows national development strategies and policies to be consistently and
effectively implemented. In some circumstances, the structure is fragmented and
thus fosters competition or conflict between bureaucratic agencies rather than
oversight. The third dimension is the collection of governmental and societal
mechanisms for monitoring how policies are implemented and what businesses
are actually doing (as opposed to what they might say they are doing or fail to
mention they are doing). Information disclosure and transparency standards
allow the general public to monitor firms as well. As we show below, examining
change along these three dimensions aids in understanding the uncertainty that
firms in China face.
In addition, while prior research has shown that change agents are key to
understanding recoupling,10 our research shows that the gap between regulation
and enforcement has been closing due to mechanisms corresponding to those same
three dimensions; that is, through shifts in government priorities and leader incen-
tives, governmental reorganization, and increasing pressure for transparency and
monitoring. Our framework thus adds to the emerging literature on “recoupling.”11
Finally, we also identify some practical implications for doing business in China
along those three dimensions.
We developed this framework based on 147 interviews with company
leaders, business consultants, governmental officials, and civil society leaders
across 63 organizations; original case studies of corporate environmental practices
and strategies; and extensive archival research on environmental regulation and
implementation in China. (See the Appendix for more details on our data sources
and methods.)
Figure 1 outlines our general framework, showing: How, along our three
dimensions, China has moved from a period of decoupling to the present recou-
pling; and what the current recoupling suggests for managerial practice in China.
While this framework is based on our work in China, we believe that examining
decoupling and recoupling along these three dimensions is increasingly important
in general, as governments—particularly those in emerging economies—try to
adjust to global norms.12
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The Decoupling of Regulation and Enforcement in China
Since opening its door to the outside world in the late 1970s, and particularly
since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has increasingly
implemented global regulatory standards in a number of realms, including labor,
environmental protection, and product safety. This is consistent with sociological
research on globalization that finds that, as nations increasingly become embedded
in the international community, they adopt standard sets of practices, leading to
global homogenization of governmental policies and actions.13 For instance, prior
research has identified how particular governmental actions to protect the natural
environment (such as passing an environmental impact law or initiating an envi-
ronmental ministry) diffused around the world as countries joined international
organizations such as the WTO.14
Some conclude that this apparent global harmonization process is often
nothing more than decoupling: A country adopts regulations to appear legitimate,
but the regulations don’t fit in with that country’s culture and institutions or the
country lacks the money or expertise to implement and enforce them, so they
are not implemented and enforced and very little changes occur.15 Our field
FIGURE 1. Framework for Understanding the Decoupling and Recoupling of Regulation
and Enforcement in China
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research provides many examples of this decoupling phenomenon, particularly
during China’s initial period of rapid economic development when the focus
was on growth.
Our theoretical framework shows how growth orientation leads to decou-
pling along the three dimensions previously introduced. Along these dimensions,
the decoupling takes the form of misaligned incentives and regulatory competition,
fragmented authority within the bureaucracy, and lack of transparency, monitor-
ing, and reporting standards.
Priorities and Incentives: Intense Growth Orientation
Leads to Misaligned Incentives and Regulatory Competition
In China, over the past three decades, promoting economic growth has
been the primary goal of governments, and the careers of local government offi-
cials were linked to local economic growth.16 For example, a study of provincial
leader turnover in China between 1979 and 1995 found that a leader’s chances
for promotion increased—and the chances of termination decreased—significantly
with his or her economic performance.17 Such political incentives generated
dynamic regional competition for economic growth, which led to “competitive
liberalism,”18 wherein local governments competed aggressively to offer advanta-
geous conditions to investors. Consistent with prior research on decoupling that
has shown aligning monitoring and incentive mechanisms with goals to be crucial
for implementation,19 it was in local government’s best interests to ignore or
violate national environmental regulations.20
Such a dynamic, in which local governmental actors compete to offer posi-
tive economic conditions for corporations, is also identified in the legal literature
showing that subordinate political jurisdictions aim to create vibrant political econo-
mies and thus establish local regulatory regimes that are favorable to corporations
and economic activity, a condition that has created the euphemistic “race to the bot-
tom.”21 Our research uncovered numerous cases of firms moving production from
the East Coast of China, where environmental regulation is more onerous, to the
middle or the west of the country, a practice known as “regulation shopping.”22
For example, in 2006, the Xiamen city government officially approved the construc-
tion of a plant to make Paraxylene (also known as PX, an important ingredient in
polyester), with a US$10.8 billion investment, the city’s largest industrial project.
PX had already been shown to be harmful to aquatic organisms and evidence
suggested that excessive exposure may affect the brain, digestive system, and repro-
ductive system in unborn children.23 The plant became notorious for pollution and
contamination of the nearby region and, following local residents’ protests, was
forced to relocate to Changchow, a more remote region in Fujian province. The
Changchow government knew how environmentally damaging the plant would
be, but aggressively sought the relocation for its economic benefit and even changed
the project’s name to mitigate the media backlash.
Our interviewees spoke frequently of local governments’ lax enforcement of
environmental provisions, even at the expense of local residents’ health, because
the polluters were the main source of revenue and employment. For instance, from
2003 to 2006, nonferrous metal manufacturers in Gansu Province were found to be
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responsible for lead poisoning in an estimated 80 thousand residents, many of
whom had appealed to their local governments several times in vain. In September
2006, hundreds of children were sent to the hospital with abnormally high
blood-lead levels. Yet the company responsible for this was included in a key
“protection list” of companies that were exempt from inspection by governmental
entities, including the Environment Bureau, so it evaded prosecution.
Bureaucratic Alignment: Fragmented Authority of Agencies
The alignment of a government entity’s goals and strategies and its place
in the larger structure of the government affects how well regulation and enfor-
cement are coupled.24 In China, besides the incentive structure that impedes
implementation of environmental protection policies, there is also an important
alignment issue within the bureaucracy, leading to conflicts between the frag-
mented elements of the government. As illustrated in Figure 2, provincial gov-
ernments, China’s Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP), and economic
development agencies such as the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology, the Ministry of Commerce, and the State Assets Supervision and
Administration Committee (SASAC) are at the same bureaucratic level and do
not have power over their counterpart agencies. Their administrative goals,
however, are very different and frequently contradictory. MEP’s efforts, for
example, are frequently undermined by other government agencies, particularly
those responsible for promoting local economic development. Even within local
governments, there are economic development agencies (such as the bureaus of
industry and IT, commerce, and transportation) and regulatory agencies (including
FIGURE 2. Fragmented Authority within the Chinese Bureaucracy
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environment protection agencies) with similar hierarchical status but with
opposing missions. Economic development agencies are frequently able to obstruct
the efforts of environment protection agencies in the name of local economic
development; the local governments, frequently hungry for economic advantage,
take their side. In the metallurgical sector—universally considered a pollution-
intensive industry—the MEP enacted emission reduction measures. However, this
industry is one of the major economic development drivers in areas such as Jiangxi
and Hunan Provinces, so the metal industry commission (a branch of local govern-
ment) and the provincial government typically were able to override MEP’s
provisions.
The central government, MEP, and several other government agencies
have developed a number of well-publicized environmental protection policies,
such as the Green Credit Policy, but these policies lack coercive measures to
ensure backing by other government/legal agencies in China’s federated legal
system and therefore are not strictly enforced. The Green Credit Policy established
more stringent bank-lending standards, requiring companies—mostly in the
pollution-intensive papermaking, coke processing, pharmaceuticals, iron and
steel, and brewery industries—to prepare environmental assessments and to
implement environment-protection regulations. However, Taiwan Xianglu Cor-
poration, owner of the Xiamen PX project, was able to evade the Green Credit
Policy by assembling a collection of loans, which it claimed had been made before
the policy’s promulgation. Agriculture Bank of China loaned 3 billion renminbi
(RMB), China Merchants Bank loaned 1.5 billion RMB, and Everbright Bank
loaned 1 billion RMB for this project. These were large loans, so deferring or
suspending the PX project would have had severe repercussions on the balance
sheets of these banks. Because the interests of the Changchow government were
well-aligned with those of the Xianglu Corporation and the major investing
banks, but were not aligned with those of the government agencies concerned
with protecting the environment, Xianglu was able to evade the Green Credit
Policy.25 Our informants also reported that the local environmental department
even developed media campaigns to educate the residents on how to face this
issue “correctly.”
Bureaucratic units focused on economic development have traditionally
been MEP’s chief organizational rivals, revealing a tension between economic
growth and environmental performance. The logic that environmental protection
inherently contradicts economic growth has enabled other administrative agen-
cies to obstruct the MEP’s efforts to implement environmental laws and regula-
tions. Thus, fragmented authority among governmental agencies has weakened
the implementation of environment protection regulations in China, making it
possible for corporations and local governments to decouple from the central
government’s stipulations.
Transparency and Monitoring: Lack of Reporting Standards
A growing set of research has shown that selective information disclosure
by organizations creates an opportunity for decoupling.26 For example, some
firms that have promoted a public image of environment friendliness have later
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been shown to be major polluters. In the West, such inaccurate self-presentation
on environmental issues is known as greenwashing.27 In China, lack of transpar-
ency has been seen as a serious impediment to the implementation of the Green
Credit Policy. In 2008, for example, Bank of China provided 0.45 billion RMB in
financing to Dongling Corporation, the largest privately owned mining company
in Shanxi Province. Although the loan specified Dongling’s compliance with the
Green Credit Policy, the company was subsequently exposed by local residents
for extensive lead poisoning of the surrounding areas.28
As the regulatory environment in China became more rigorous—at least
on paper—more firms began to issue corporate social responsibility (CSR) or sus-
tainability reports and to display their environmentally conscious projects and
technology on the Internet. However, without established standards for what
should be included in a CSR report, many firms publicized the positive while con-
cealing the negative. China National Petroleum Corporation’s 68-page 2010 CSR
report had much to say about the company’s safety and energy-saving practices,
but only mentioned in one sentence that it had been responsible for a recent
pipeline explosion near Dalian; experts estimate the 1,500-ton oil leak will require
3 to 10 years of decontamination.29 Even the positive claims in some CSR reports
have been found to be exaggerated or false.30
In closing, our theoretical framework and research has identified a number
of important mechanisms that have led to the decoupling of regulation and enforce-
ment in China over the last three decades of economic growth. Our framework
highlights how, at a general level, the conflicting incentives for local officials and
competition across regions, structural misalignment of the bureaucracy, and lack of
transparency standards led to decoupling.
The Recoupling of Regulation and Enforcement in China
While the first few decades of research on decoupling focused on its
causes,31 more recent research shows how it can evolve. A recent study of a post-
communist agency in Eastern Europe, for example, showed that the demands of
international actors were initially decoupled from the organization’s operation,
but over time, as the staff that implemented these procedures was replaced by
newer employees, the organization increasingly came to follow international stan-
dards.32 As the author of that study put it, the “ritual becomes reality.”33 Pretense
becomes practice. In the United States, too, environmental laws were quite
weak and favored industry before the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency in 1970, yet evolved over time as environmental goals became more
institutionalized.34
We argue, then, that the decoupling of environmental regulation and
enforcement in China is part of a natural evolution, not a permanent state as
frequently assumed (and feared).35 We believe that identifying this process of
recoupling at the nation-state level contributes to a dynamic understanding of
the state’s role in shaping markets and organizational behavior. We thus extend
sociological theory of the complexities of state influences to suggest a number
of more generalizable mechanisms of how the gap between regulation and
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enforcement closes—how what has been decoupled can become recoupled.
Corresponding to the three dimensions of our framework, we specify three
mechanisms by which recoupling of regulation and enforcement is being achieved
in China: a shift in governmental goals and metrics, the reorganization of the
bureaucracy, and increased scrutiny on environmental behaviors.
Priorities and Incentives: Shift in Goals and Metrics
toward Sustainable Development
Recent research on decoupling has shown that the gap between regulation
and enforcement is often a result of disagreement concerning the appropriate goals
and metrics.36 Recoupling, then, can depend in part on reaching a consensus on
goals and metrics. The Chinese Communist Party’s current official socio-economic
ideology is focused on creating a “Harmonious Society” that incorporates sustain-
able development, social welfare, and increased democracy. Many new environ-
mental laws have been passed (see Figure 3). In 2011, at the press conference
after the meetings of the two main political bodies in China, the National People’s
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Premier
Wen Jiabao announced that China will stop pursuing rapid growth at the cost of
environment degradation and natural resource deprivation. In the new Five-Year
Plan, the target for GDP growth will be lowered from 7.5 percent to 7 percent.
FIGURE 3. Major Chinese Environmental Laws since 2000
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This was widely taken as a sign that the national leadership is ready to accept a
slower GDP growth rate and will focus on welfare improvement and on socioeco-
nomic sustainability.
Local governments have followed the central government’s lead. For
example, in order to achieve the 11th Five-Year Plan’s target of emission reduc-
tion, some local governments adopted dramatic measures such as drastically reduc-
ing electricity or heating system usage. The provincial governments of Hebei,
Guangxi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang Provinces shut down a number of plants in
high-polluting industries such as iron and steel. In Zhejiang province alone, about
1,160 enterprises were shut down for 15 days. Our informants disclosed that the
central government has threatened to use an environmental “career veto,”
whereby provincial leaders will see their careers sidetracked if they do not meet
reduction plans. As a result of various energy reduction measures, during the
11th Five-Year Plan China achieved an average annual GDP growth of 11.2 percent
while energy consumption only grew by 6.6 percent annually.37
Environmental indices have also been used to evaluate the performance of
local governments and officials. In 2007, the MEP and the State Statistics Bureau
began incorporating Green GDP—a measure of sustainable development that
includes items such as local environmental costs, costs of contamination, and
other environmental impacts—into the performance evaluation system. In addi-
tion, in the latest 12th Five-Year Plan, 8 out of 24 indices measure sustainable
development: cultivated land protection, water consumption by industrial users,
water efficiency of the agricultural irrigation systems, non-fossil-fuel usage,
energy saving per unit of GDP, carbon-emission reduction per unit of GDP, major
pollutants emission reduction, and preservation of forests (see Figure 4).
The Chinese government is focusing on green investment as an incentive
for sustainable development. Various energy-saving strategies were devised for
different industries; for example, manufacturing focuses on using advanced pro-
duction facilities to replace backward technology, transportation focuses on prior-
itizing public transportation and on a better combination of various means of
transportation, construction focuses on restructuring old buildings and develop-
ing green and smart buildings, and green practices are encouraged in everyday
consumption.38
The government invested the equivalent of US$12 billion in sustainable
development from 1998 to 2007 and the 2009 economic stimulus package included
210 billion RMB (US$32 billion) for energy conservation, pollutants reduction, and
ecosystem protection projects and 400 billion RMB (US$61 billion) for new energy-
efficient housing that will use environmentally friendly materials. The stimulus plan
was by no means perfect—it encouraged some polluting industries—but “green
investment” accounted for 14.5 percent of the plan, indicating the government’s
determination to shift its values from traditional “profit maximization” to “welfare
maximization.”
The central government issued fiscal subsidies for specific industries. For
example, starting with the 11th Five-Year Plan, major electric power plants
undertaking desulfurization renovations were allowed to charge an extra
0.015 RMB/kWh. Local governments then issued similar policies to encourage
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desulfurization renovation of local power plants. For example, Jiangsu Province set
the electricity price for renewable power generating plants at 0.509 RMB /kWh,
while traditional power generating plants could only charge 0.494 RMB /kWh.
Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang Provinces undertook similar fiscal measures to
spur development of the solar and wind industries in China (and the related
equipment manufacturing); by 2007, China’s solar-panel output had reached
1188 MW, one-third of the global output (3436 MW).39 In 2010, the central
government announced a subsidy for people who buy energy-saving or new-
energy vehicles in six trial cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Changchun, Shenzhen,
Hangzhou, and Hefei). In Shenzhen, individual customers can get a subsidy of
up to 120,000 RMB for buying a vehicle that uses hybrid technology or some
other renewable source.
Bureaucratic Alignment: Reorganization of the Bureaucracy
In recent years, the government has taken significant steps to repair the
fragmentation and misalignment of its bureaucracy in order to strengthen enfor-
cement of environmental regulations. Since 2008, the MEP has been “promoted”
from a subordinate organ of the state council to a component of the state council.
Some scholars and research institutes suggest that the MEP should be vertically
supervised (by the central government) rather than laterally/horizontally super-
vised (by local governments) to further discourage local protectionism. While this
FIGURE 4. Key Environmental Provisions and Goals of the 12th Five-Year Plan
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measure has yet to be adopted, our informants noted that MEP’s expanded power
of enforcement has already been felt by local governments.
In early 2006, the central government had MEP set up 11 branches to
independently monitor and investigate environmental issues, free from local
government interference. The branches include five environmental supervision
centers in the cities of Nanjing (for east China), Guangzhou (south), Xi’an (north-
west), Chengdu (southwest), and Shenyang (northeast) tasked with investigating
serious pollution cases, helping to solve cross-regional environmental disputes,
and supervising law enforcement in national nature reserves, forest parks, and
key scenic spots. In 2008, for instance, MEP collected over 25 million national
environment inspection records, which help the agency to implement environ-
ment protection measures. Meanwhile, MEP set up a professional environment-
monitoring bureau.
Several other powerful government agencies, including the National
Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) and the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology, are also responsible for environmental issues. The NDRC,
besides its macroeconomic regulatory function, is responsible for promoting
China’s sustainable development strategy, coordinating overall energy conserva-
tion and usage, carrying out environmental planning, and coordinating ecological
construction and clean production. Local governments have also become responsi-
ble for environmental protection, which makes it easier to coordinate efforts across
government agencies and actors. Our interviews show that, under the more
powerful MEP, local governments become reluctant to intervene in a local firm’s
environmental activities. In some regions—particularly developed regions—local
governments began to participate actively in environmental protection.
Transparency and Monitoring: Increasing Standards
and Monitoring of Environmental Disclosure
Consistent with the decoupling research on environmental greenwashing,
scrutiny from outside actors serves as an effective disciplining mechanism.40 In
China, the last few years have seen increased scrutiny in transparency issues—
from governmental actors and the public—in the form of reporting, monitoring,
and giving the public a voice.
Reporting
A number of entities in the Chinese government have been promoting
environmental reporting standards. For example, the State Assets Supervision
and Administration Committee encourages the largest state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) to publish sustainable development reports and to submit quarterly, six-
month, and annual environment statements. These disclosures then play a role
in promotion decisions for SOE executives, so there are incentives to forego false
claims and to avoid actual accidents.
In 2009, Shanghai launched its first province-level CSR standards, incor-
porating environmental responsibility, green statistical methods, technology inno-
vation, and cleaner production.41 Local governments provide incentives—such as
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favorable foreign-exchange management, financial subsidy, and prompt annual
inspections—to firms conforming to this standard. As of early 2011, 2,000 out of
15,000 companies in Pudong New Area had adopted this standard and 500 more
companies had applied to the government for official appraisals.
Beginning in 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) required three
types of listed firm to publish CSR reports: firms in the corporate governance
sector and the finance sector and firms also listed in overseas stock markets. The
Shenzhen Stock Exchange demands that certain listed firms issue CSR reports
independently. As of April 30, 2010, 471 Chinese listed firms had published their
2009 CSR reports. The SSE also introduced a quantified index, “social contribu-
tion value per share,” computed by adding net profits, taxes paid, labor costs,
net interest expenses, and donations; subtracting environmental costs; and divid-
ing the result by the number of shares. In 2008, 76 listed firms disclosed
this index, ranging from 8.42 RMB/share to 0.15 RMB/share and averaging
1.97 RMB/share.42
While the increase in reporting mandates is clear, it remains to be seen if
the results are something more than elaborate greenwashing. Firms may still be
focused on communication mechanisms rather than on substantive action. For
this reason, the rise of monitoring processes to verify implementation is still a
critical part of China’s recoupling.
Monitoring
China has made various efforts to establish more extensive monitoring of
sustainability performance. Early in 2008, the MEP took a major step toward a
“green securities policy” by stipulating that highly polluting companies must pass
environmental inspections when applying for an initial public offering (IPO) or for
refinancing. The regulation, building on a China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion requirement that companies planning IPOs should include an MEP assess-
ment with their application, targeted companies engaged in power generation
and steel, cement, and aluminum production and companies in what are called
“double-intensive” industries—high energy consumption and highly polluting
industries such as metallurgy, coal, textiles, and paper. Companies that operate
in only one province can seek assessments from local authorities, while those that
operate in multiple provinces need MEP approval.
MEP and environmental protection agencies at other levels have been
investing extensively in environmental-monitoring systems that can provide a basis
for enforcement. By 2008, there were 131,000 environment-monitoring devices,
3,793 air-quality-monitoring spots, 9,635 water-quality-monitoring sections on
land, and 1,203 water-quality-monitoring spots offshore. 1,021 cities had initiated
quality monitoring of their drinking-water sources. In addition, in 2010, a monitor-
ing network was further established throughout the country, including an auto-
mated real-time system to monitor surface water and an automated air-quality
detection system covering 113 key environmental protection cities. As of 2011,
there are 2,492 environmental monitoring institutes, with 53,000 staff, across the
country.
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Policies to Give the Public a Voice
The Chinese public is becoming increasingly aware of, and concerned about,
environmental abuses and is exerting increasing pressure on corporations and the
government to improve standards. In 2006, the MEP released the Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) process, the first official act in China to encourage broad
public participation in environmental issues. It clarifies the rights and obligations of
the public, developers, and environmental groups in the EIA process and specifies
five vehicles for public participation: opinion surveys, consultations, seminars,
debates, and hearings. Project developers or their commissioned EIA agents are
required to represent a broad range of regions, occupations, and expertise when
selecting individuals or groups to review their reports. They are also required to
make these assessments clear, concise, and widely available to the public.
Global studies have found that societies can experience a rise in environ-
mentalism both as a direct response to increasing degradation of the environ-
ment43 and as an effect of rising affluence.44 In this latter case, environmental
quality is viewed as a luxury good that a country pursues once its citizenry has
accumulated sufficient wealth to meet more basic needs.45 In China, it is not only
those directly affected (for example, by polluted water) that have started to voice
their complaints; the general public is increasingly expressing concern for the nat-
ural environment. NGOs, environmentalists, and the consumer movement are all
putting pressure on polluting firms. In 2001, environmental protection agencies at
various levels received 369,712 letters of complaint/reporting, but by 2008, the
number had risen to 705,127.46
The general public uses numerous media channels to provide and obtain
information on environmental issues. The Internet, in particular, plays an increas-
ing role in the growing public pressure on those issues.47 After the 2010 Dalian oil
spill, for example, the afflicted fishing residents kept appealing to higher authori-
ties for financial compensation and Internet users disclosed subsequent events to
increase the publicity. There were 420 million Internet users in China in 2010
and the number is expected to climb to 750 million by 2015. These users access
an increasing wealth of information (for example, from miniblogs, called “weibo”
in Chinese), including information about direct threats to their health.
For example, the hidden danger from the Xiamen PX plant discussed
earlier was disclosed by an academic at the Chinese Academy of Science and
was disseminated to the general public through the Internet, e-mails, and cell
phone messages. In response, Xiamen citizens held a large-scale demonstration
to protest against the PX construction project. The local government then used
the Internet to conduct a public opinion poll and held a public symposium, invit-
ing civil representatives, members of major political bodies such as the Consulta-
tive Conference, and the local media. Eventually, the PX project was forced to
leave.
In summary, the recoupling of regulation and enforcement is gaining
momentum in China. Mechanisms include a shift in government priorities from
economic growth at all costs to sustainable growth, an increasing alignment of
government entities so that environmental protection efforts are not consistently
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undermined, and a rise in the availability of environmental information and the
establishment of standards for disclosure by businesses. This transition from
decoupling to recoupling creates tremendous uncertainty for business. Under
the old paradigm of decoupling, economic growth dominated all other objectives,
so all levels of government had a pro-business orientation.48 Businesses therefore
operated in a relatively certain environment in which environmental issues were
seldom salient. The recoupling process, however, can increase firm uncertainty.
Economic growth is still important, but sustainable development is gaining
ground. Economic development still matters for official promotion while new
incentive packages, intended to promote sustainable growth, take time to develop.
New policies are implemented to different degrees in different regions, where
there are different balances of bargaining and lobbying power amongst sectional
interests, consumers, community residents, and other stakeholders.
What should firms do in this uncertain environment? How should they
deal with each of the major areas identified?
Implications for Doing Business in China: Effective
Environmental Strategies for Corporations
While prior work on how companies address regulatory uncertainty
focused either on particular regulations49 or on particular organizational charac-
teristics,50 our theoretical framework clearly identifies how companies can address
the uncertainty stemming from changes in state priorities, structure, and actions.
Such macro-environmental uncertainty is particularly important in emerging
markets characterized by insufficient and ineffective market institutions and by
lack of the rule of law.51 Prior theory has found that perceived uncertainty may
create an advantage for innovative firms.52 Recent examples show how both
multinational corporations (MNCs) and Chinese companies created successful
strategies to address shifts in priorities and incentives, bureaucratic realignment,
and increased transparency and monitoring.
Strategies to Address the Shift in Priorities and Incentives
As described above, the shift of China’s national development strategies
from raw economic growth to more sustainable development brought changes
in environmental regulation and enforcement. What follow are strategies for
organizations to address this shift by aligning their goals with governmental
signals and by embracing environmental innovation.
Align with Governmental Signals
Sociological research has identified important normative features of govern-
mental action whereby governments with weaker coercive features establish
principles and signal values and priorities through their actions.53 China is no
exception, but what is unique about China is that it still has a powerful govern-
ment that plays a critical role in allocating resources and business opportunities.54
Thus, a corporation doing business in China should make a particular effort to
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focus on the areas that the government has signaled to be important, particularly in the
area of industrial policy, in order to identify areas of future growth. Our infor-
mants revealed to us that successful companies in China devote significant time
and resources to analyzing the business implications of announced governmental
plans and policies in order to detect opportunities. For example, Advantech, a
Taiwan-based MNC, extensively studied the 12th Five-Year Plan, in which it
found huge opportunities in smart devices connected to the Internet and in tech-
nical infrastructure in Western China. As a result, Advantech has enjoyed about
30 percent sales growth in the past two years. In the environmental realm, over
80 multinational and Chinese firms have joined the China Greentech Initiative
in a collective effort to better understand—and profit from—the Chinese govern-
ment’s recent attention to environmental issues.
Following the Chinese government’s signals, many foreign and domestic
banks initiated environment-friendly credit policies. Bank of East Asia launched
“Recruitment and Selection of Green Credit Program” activities to promote green
business models. The private equity department of Development Bank of Singa-
pore established a billion-dollar fund for investment in the environment protec-
tion sector and to encourage the promotion of new energy. Standard Chartered
Bank issued a Green Credit Policy targeting small and medium-sized businesses.
Many foreign banks, such as ABN Amro, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC, developed
new financial products addressing climate change and taking advantage of the
Carbon Trading System. In 2010, China PingAn Group, an insurance and asset
management company, launched its “Low-carbon Action 100” project, promoting
sustainable development through financial products and services innovation. It
details 100 concrete actions by which companies can reduce their energy con-
sumption and carbon emissions. Such measures help these foreign banks win
approval by the Chinese government and other authorities; China PingAn Group
was named “Best Low-Carbon Enterprise in China” by Economic Observer and the
Economic Observer Research Institute, received the 14th Asian Insurance
Award-Corporate Social Responsibility Award from Asia Insurance Review, and
was designated one of the “Top 100 World Low-Carbon Environmental Driving
Forces in China” by the World Economic and Environmental Conference.
Taken together, these examples suggest three ways for companies to better
follow governmental signals:
§ Be preemptive in order to anticipate policy change. When the Chinese govern-
ment first called for building a harmonious society, Vanke, a real estate
company, realized that future government policy might require residential
buildings to include levels for the rich, the middle class, and the poor. The
company then set about developing mixed-income residential commu-
nities. This preemptive policy helped Vanke to stabilize its business during
economic fluctuations and to become the largest real estate company in
China.
§ Study policies extensively. As we saw with Advantech, careful study of gov-
ernment policies, such as the Five-Year Plans, can reveal huge business
opportunities.
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§ Do not overtly challenge the government’s environmental policies. Partly due to
China’s colonial history, the Chinese government is very sensitive to MNCs
challenging its authority. Google is a recent and prominent example of
a foreign company losing business in China by openly challenging the
government.
Embrace Environmental Innovation
In parallel to its focus on environmental protection, the Chinese govern-
ment has encouraged environmental innovation, aiming to make China a leader
in solar, wind, and battery technologies. Each of these industries has experienced
rapid development in the past several years and has nurtured many companies.
Green technology innovation includes such fields as cleaner production
technology, emission-reduction technology, and renewable-energy utilization
technology55 and has attracted a growing number of firms. Engine manufacturer
Weichai Power, for example, developed a mission of “Green Power, International
Weichai.” In 2005, it designed and produced the “Blue Engine” line, the first 10-
and 12-liter high-power engines based on the European Union (EU) III emission
standard. Compared to previous engines based on the national II standard, the
“Blue Engine” reduces sulfur dioxide by half, total pollutants by 40 percent, and
energy consumption by 5 to 10 percent—down to 3 grams/watt/hour and below
the world record. China introduced the national III standard in 2009 and will
adopt the national IV standard in 2012, but Weichai had already produced
EU IV products in 2006 and EU V products in 2009, several years ahead of the
Chinese government’s requirements. Such environmental-friendly innovation
going beyond governmental regulations not only brought Weichai various awards
and a high reputation, but increased its market share and profits. By 2009,
Weichai had over 40 percent of the Chinese market for trucks over 14 tons, more
than 80 percent of carriers used Weichai engines, and the firm had become a
credible challenger to Cummins.
Environmentally conscious projects range from forest-recovery to oil-erosion-
restoration to pollution-source-control programs. For instance, a Chinese press
published a book using 100-percent-recycled paper in 2008. The 50,000 copies
of the book saved 313 trees, 1,840 cubic meters of water, 11,000 kilowatts of elec-
tricity, and 5,500 kilograms of chemical materials. The 2009 Beijing Book Fair saw
dozens of publishers using more recycled paper; about 30 percent of the books
were printed on “green” stock. In addition, Beijing Hongwenguan Press and
Xianzhi Xianxing Press promised to print exclusively on recycled paper within
three years.
Companies can also promote their environmental awareness to the public
through their websites and CSR reports, through interactive media such as Inter-
net forums and miniblogs, and at trade fairs and public events such as the 2010
Shanghai World Expo. Broad Group, for instance, built its six-story pavilion at
the Shanghai World Expo in one day using a new sustainable prefabricated build-
ing technology that is five times more energy-efficient and six times more material-
efficient than a comparable traditional building. The Broad Group pavilion is also
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able to withstand a magnitude 9 earthquake and has an interior air quality that is
20 times cleaner than that of normal buildings. Such efforts build both corporate
reputation and competitive advantage.
Strategies to Address Bureaucratic Realignment
As described above, the structure of the Chinese state bureaucracy has
recently been reorganized and rationalized; the MEP has been elevated in impor-
tance and environmental protection efforts have been better coordinated. How-
ever, there are still conflicts between administrative levels and between
agencies. To address this uncertainty, firms should avoid regulatory shopping
and should integrate local and global standards.
Avoid Regulatory Shopping
Both MNCs and domestic firms have taken advantage of China’s regional
competition and fragmented bureaucracy to “shop around” for lower—sometimes
deliberately lowered—environmental and labor standards. However, as China’s
bureaucracy becomes more aligned with national goals for environmental protec-
tion and environmental security, this is becoming increasingly difficult. Although
Foxconn, a controversial contract manufacturer, recently shifted some facilities to
interior provinces such as Henan and Sichuan to take advantage of lower cost and
scrutiny in these regions, firms now risk losing public image and competitive
advantage by being seen as exploitive. As China’s interior areas develop, as
national and local development strategies shift, and as the bureaucracy becomes
more integrated, MNCs in particular should recognize that there are increasing
long-term costs to regulatory shopping that may outweigh the short-term
benefits.
Integrate Local and Global Standards
The combination of bureaucratic realignment and increasing globalization
requires MNCs to integrate local and global standards of environmental protec-
tion. MNCs can find themselves faced with a variegated institutional environment
and competing stakeholder demands. For example, MNCs can benefit from
China’s lighter environmental regulation, low-cost labor, and government incen-
tives such as tax benefits, yet both the government and the public expect these
firms to contribute to China’s development by bringing in advanced technology and higher
standards of environmental protection, product quality, and treatment of labor. Over the
past several decades, some MNCs have capitalized on China’s bureaucratic frag-
mentation to use the Chinese market as a place to dump products that would
be considered inferior or outdated at home. This strategy has cultivated distrust
and grievances and, as China’s bureaucracy becomes more aligned, such strategies
are increasingly out of favor.56
The growing prosperity of the Chinese market has led many MNCs to shift
their focus from supply chain issues to engage more closely with local stakeholders
in China. For such firms, conducting R&D in environmental-friendly technology
in China becomes a new competition strategy. For example, almost all MNCs
in the automobile industry—including Toyota, GM, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz,
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Honda, Hyundai, and Ford—have established major R&D centers in China. One
focus of these R&D centers is energy-saving technology. As early as 2007,
Volkswagen (China) promised to reduce energy consumption and emission by
20 percent in all automobiles under its brand by 2010. Many MNCs started to
publish China-specific CSR reports or at least to translate their global CSR reports
into Chinese. GE’s 2009 environmental report included China-specific infor-
mation on resource consumption and emissions. As the Chinese state becomes
more internally aligned, such integration of local and global standards will be a
requirement for companies doing business there.
Strategies to Address Transparency and Monitoring
Both the government and the public in China are expecting higher
standards of transparency and reporting from the companies. While for now this
can create uncertainties for companies, their goal should be to meet—if not
exceed—these expectations in order to build a robust reputation.
Be Transparent
In the past, MNCs were reluctant to respond to local information require-
ments and complaints. However, the increasing pressure from the government
and the public, amplified by the Internet, have pushed MNCs and domestic firms
to be more responsive and transparent. The Internet, because of its low cost, easy
access, fast diffusion of information, and interactive posting, has become crucial to
an organization’s survival and success. At the same time, online “information” is
difficult to verify and—due to the difficulty of regulating information flow on the
Internet and the lack of rule of law in China—the harm caused by an online attack
on a company’s reputation can be swift, devastating, and hard to repair. The con-
ventional business practice of trying to hide as much information as possible has
become more and more untenable in the information era. MNCs doing business
in China should therefore make sure to have a mechanism ready for managing
transparency issues in an emergency. The global financial crisis has recently fired
up the demand for transparency in the West,57 but a combination of external and
internal pressures are driving the same demand in China, where Western MNCs
will be expected to lead the way in creating more open transparency norms. MNCs
should therefore think well past damage control to promoting a high standard of
transparency through their websites, CSR reports, environmental annual reports,
news conferences, and so on.
Compete on Reputation
Management scholars have demonstrated that reputation is a key intangi-
ble asset for a firm and that social and environmental activities are a way to gain
reputation.58 While the chaotic environment and informational asymmetry in
China previously allowed widespread opportunism and irresponsible corporate
behavior,59 corporate reputation has become increasingly important with the
transition to a market economy and the rise of the Internet. Companies doing
business in China are less likely to get away with irresponsible behavior, including
environmental abuse.
Regulatory Uncertainty and Corporate Responses to Environmental Protection in China
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 54, NO. 1 FALL 2011 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU 57
To compete based on reputation, firms must be consistent and ethical in
their statements and actions. Such a strategy begins with a farsighted perspective
when developing the firm’s competitive strategy. For example, when bribery was pop-
ular, particularly for real estate companies, Vanke consistently maintained its
business ethics and developed its key business capabilities, which has proven to
be an insightful and successful strategy in the long run. Broad Group, an air-
conditioning manufacturer, was well known for its strict ethical standards, which
prohibited any form of bribery for contracts by its sales staff.60 These firms have
seen their good reputations become strong competitive advantages with the
transition to a market economy.
Competition based on reputation, particularly for companies pursuing
strategies of environment protection, also requires environmentally aware corporate
leaders. The chief executive officer of automaker BYD, for example, is described as
an innovative and insightful technology enthusiast whose innovations help save
the environment. Since BYD first introduced its new-energy car, the F3DM, the
company has gained policy benefits and government support. For example, in
Shenzhen, an individual customer buying a BYD can have half the cost—some
US$19,000—subsidized by the central and local governments. Consequently, by
2010, BYD had become the fifth-largest automobile producer in China. Vanke,
the real estate company, continuously makes efforts to reduce its carbon-dioxide
emissions and emphasizes green as the key concept in construction largely because
its chairman, Wang Shi, has a strong environmental consciousness; he even
participated in the 2011 Copenhagen climate change summit as an independent
business leader.
Lastly, being consistent in word and deed is crucial for reputation. As environ-
mental issues became more important in China, many firms began to display their
environmental awareness in corporate reports, company websites, and elsewhere.
However, when their actions did not live up to their claims, they were left wide
open for attack by competitors, customers, and the general public. Ford, for exam-
ple, invited more scrutiny from activists about its environmental responsibility
than its competitors did because its leadership had pledged publicly to create
an environmentally friendly auto company.61 After the Sichuan earthquake in
2008, some MNCs were criticized as “iron roosters” (tie gongji, a Chinese idiom
for stingy people) in part because their donations to the recovery did not strike
people as matching their public claims to be socially responsible companies.
The main reputational difficulty for Mengniu, a dairy company implicated in the
2008 melamine-tainted milk scandal, was not simply the scandal itself, but the
gap between Mengniu’s involvement in the scandal and its former CEO’s public
presentation of the company as a pioneer of corporate social responsibility.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the decoupling and recoupling of the regulation and
enforcement of environmental protection in China and have presented major
implications for doing business there. The theoretical framework we developed
highlights three core dimensions of the changing situation in China: Priorities
Regulatory Uncertainty and Corporate Responses to Environmental Protection in China
58 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY VOL. 54, NO. 1 FALL 2011 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
and incentives, bureaucratic alignment, and transparency and monitoring. Identi-
fying these dimensions helped us unpack the common mechanisms leading to
the decoupling of regulation and enforcement, including incentives, regional
competition, fragmented bureaucratic organization, and lack of transparency
standards, all of which undermined enforcement. The same three dimensions helped
us unpack the common mechanisms leading to the current recoupling of regulation
and enforcement, including the shift in national development strategy from raw
economic growth to sustainable development and a harmonious society, the reorga-
nization and realignment of the Chinese bureaucracy, and increasing monitoring on
the part of the government, the media, and the general public. Finally, our three
dimensions helped us provide managerial recommendations, including following
the signals of the changing national development strategy, embracing environ-
ment-friendly innovation, resisting the temptation of regulatory shopping, integrat-
ing global and local standards, practicing transparency, and building a sturdy
reputation, particularly with respect to protecting the environment.
We view regulation and enforcement as dynamic and interactive, evolving
over time. Such a perspective allows us to identify the key recoupling mechanisms
that have recently led to greater alignment between environmental regulation
and enforcement in China. While much research has examined decoupling and,
more recently, a few scholars have begun to examine recoupling, the particular
bureaucratic and structural mechanisms underlying these processes have not been
well identified. Further, while recoupling studies have mostly examined how it is
driven by individual change agents in an organization,62 our macro perspective at
the nation-state level highlights how national-level regulatory systems can also be
recoupled over time. Thus, our framework, as presented in Figure 1, provides
important insights on how regulatory systems evolve over time, a fine-grained
perspective that allows us to generate strategic recommendations for business
leaders.
Our approach also helps us understand regulatory and economic changes
in other societies, especially those with emerging markets. The common perspec-
tive that environmental enforcement is decoupled from regulation in emerging
markets63 can now be augmented with an understanding of specific drivers for
the decoupling and recoupling processes.
Companies doing business in China that fail to adapt to its rapidly changing
circumstances will increasingly fall behind. Being farsighted in linking internal
and external strategies and actions is one of the keys to success in China. As
one of our business executive informants put it, “You have to look to the future.
Who could imagine what China would be like today 30 years ago? China is devel-
oping so fast. If you just focus on today, you will lose tomorrow.”
APPENDIX
Data Sources and Research Methods
Our data sources include both first-hand interview data and extensive
secondary archival data. Between 2008 and 2011, we conducted 147 on-site
interviews at 63 organizations in a broad cross-section of industries and at
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government entities, environmental NGOs, and business consultancies focused on
sustainability issues. (See Table A1 for a numerical summary.)
The companies include a number of well-known private Chinese firms
such as Vanke, China’s largest real estate company; BYD, an automobile manufac-
turing firm that produces new-energy automobiles; and Broad Group, the leading
Chinese air-conditioning manufacturer. We also studied some key Chinese SOEs,
including Weichai Power, an engine producer; State Grid, the country’s main
power supplier; China Ocean Shipping; and Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China. Among MNCs and other important market participants, we conducted
on-site interviews at Advantech, a Taiwan-based industrial computer manufacturer;
Tsing Capital, an environmental venture-capital firm; and the China Greentech
Initiative, a sustainable development consulting firm. We conducted additional
in-depth interviews at 20 small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
For five of the companies mentioned above, we developed in-depth pub-
lished case studies of their social and environmental management and reporting
processes.64 Developing these case studies allowed us to gain insight into the
changes in China’s environmental regulations and enforcement as well as into firm
practices. As described in Table A-1, we also interviewed a number of consultants—
including people from McKinsey, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Syntao, and Business
for Social Responsibility—who were working with companies on their environ-
mental management issues. We also interviewed a number of government officials
to learn about the changes in environmental protection, regulation, and enforce-
ment. The majority of our interviews were recorded and transcribed, allowing us
to refer to them while developing our theoretical framework.
In addition, we searched archival and media data extensively to better
understand environmental management practices in China. Such archival data
ranges from laws, regulations, and national policies to local government enfor-
cement activities and the corporate responses to environmental actions. In
particular, we searched various MEP archives, news reports, and hundreds of
CSR reports. In many cases, archival research corroborated information we
had already obtained in interviews. Where possible, we provide endnotes to
our archival sources so readers can examine those cases in more detail. The
combination of primary and secondary data gives us both breadth and depth;
our knowledge of the facts has helped us identify the underlying generalizable
mechanisms.
TABLE A1. Summary of Interviews Conducted by Organization Type, 2008-2011
Organization Type # Organizations # Interviews
Consulting 11 20
Government 7 8
Multinational Corporation (MNC) 14 32
Nonprofit Organization 10 13
Private Chinese Firm 14 34
State Owned Enterprise (SOE) 7 40
Grand Total 63 147
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